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 Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the interest rate pass-through in Hungary, with the help of ECM 
and TAR models, using both aggregated and bank level data. According to the linear ECM 
results, the corporate loan market, which is characterized by the strongest competition, 
adjusts its prices fully and quickly to the short-term money market rate. The adjustment of 
deposit rates and household loan rates is characterized by incompleteness and/or 
sluggishness. We analyze the potential non-linearities of banks’ pricing by TAR models. 
The results suggest that the speed of adjustment of bank rates depends on the size of the 
changes in the money market rate and the distance of bank rates from their long-term 
equilibrium level. The sign of yield shocks and the volatility of the market rate also turn out 
to be influential to the speed of adjustment. 
 
 
 
JEL classifications: E43, E52, G21. 
Keywords: interest rate pass-through, monetary transmission, ECM, TAR model. 
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 1 Introduction 
The decisions of banks about the yields on their assets and liabilities have an impact on the 
expenditure and investment behavior of deposit holders and borrowers and hence, on the 
real economy. Interest rates can influence the real economy through three main 
mechanisms of the interest rate channel. The reaction of companies and households 
depends on the magnitude of the substitution effect, i.e. the change in the relative costs of 
alternative credit and deposit possibilities. Changes in the interest rates alter the costs and 
incomes of economic agents and, consequently, their net income (income effect). Finally, they 
affect the value of real and financial assets and, therefore, the wealth of companies and 
households (wealth effect).  
The way changes in central bank interest rates are passed through to changes in banks’ 
yields determines the strength of these effects to a great extent. Thus, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy depends on the degree and speed of interest rate adjustment to changes in 
policy-controlled interest rates.  
Both theoretically and empirically, the interest rate channel of monetary transmission has 
received great attention in the past. There are several papers on the stickiness of bank retail 
rates and the sluggishness of bank responses to changes in market conditions in the euro 
countries. The results of these studies show that interest rate transmission differs both 
across countries and instruments.  Cottarelli and Kourelis (1995) studying several European 
countries find evidence of complete pass-through for most countries. In their study, the 
long-term adjustment parameter on average is 0.97 and falls within the range of 0.75–1.25 
in most of the cases. In Borio and Fritz (1994) this value is between 0.8 and 1.1. Burgstaller 
(2003) finds similar results for Austria and so does Bredin (2001) for Ireland. De Bondt 
(2002), who studies adjustments for the euro countries, concludes the long-term pass-
through for bank lending rates is close to 100%.  
Differences in the speed of adjustment proved to be much more considerable: duration of 
adjustment varied between 2 months and 3 years. Mojon (2000) measures the degree of 
pass-through in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, France, The Netherlands and 
Spain. He assumes complete pass-through in the long-run and focuses on the short-run 
reactions. He finds (1) sluggish responses of retail rates, (2) the response of short-term 
rates to be faster than that of long-term rates, and (3) a higher (short-term) pass-through 
when money rates increase compared to when they decrease. De Bondt (2002) also finds 
considerable stickiness in short-term adjustment of bank rates and also shows that there is 
convergence in the pass-through of the euro countries after the establishment of the 
Monetary Union.  
There are also a few articles that analyze the adjustment of bank rates to inter-bank rates in 
Hungary. Világi and Vincze (1995) use AutoRegressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models to 
examine the pass-through in the period 1991-1995 and find sluggish adjustment of interest 
rates and emphasize that the adjustment is far from complete, even in the long run. Based 
on visual inspection of stabilizing and decreasing spreads, Árvai (1998) concludes that in 
the period 1992-1998 the reaction of commercial banks’ interest rates had the tendency for 
somewhat better adjustment, especially after 1996. Várhegyi (2003) mainly focuses on the 
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strength of competition, but also touches upon the speed of adjustment of bank rates to 
the two-week interbank rate. By regressing differenced bank rates on contemporaneous 
and lagged values of differenced money market rate (MMR) she concludes that corporate 
loan and deposit rates adjust at a faster pace than household rates, although the paper does 
not incorporate the long-run dynamics of bank rates. In a recent paper Crespo-Cuaresma et 
al. (2004) study three new EU countries with an ARDL model. They find complete pass-
through for the short-term corporate loan rate and incomplete pass-through for the 
household deposit rates in Hungary.  
Our paper differs from the existing empirical literature on the Hungarian pass-through not 
only because of the difference in the sample periods, but also because of the different 
methodologies. In this study we apply panel data analysis in addition to analyzing aggregate 
data. We apply various error-correction (ECM) models to investigate the pass-through 
from local currency (Forint) MMR to local currency interest rates in the Hungarian banking 
system. Besides the standard linear ECM, we augment the model with Threshold 
AutoRegressive (TAR) features to study different kinds of non-linearities in the adjustment 
process. We study nonlinearities related to the size of disequilibrium and yield shocks, to 
the sign of disequilibrium and yield shocks, and to volatility. Our sample period covers 
January 1997–April 2004 for monthly aggregate data and January 2001–January 2004 for 
monthly bank-level data. In the later case we use data for 25 banks in a panel framework. 
The selection of the sample period is motivated by data availability and comparability and 
by the fact that changes in the banking system and in the monetary regime make data of 
previous years uninformative. 
We focus on the pass-through from short-term MMRs and not from the policy rate 
because MMRs are much closer related to the cost of funding of the banks. However, since 
inter-bank rates adjust very quickly and efficiently to the central bank interest rate, we can 
extrapolate our findings to changes in the policy rate.  
Comparing our results with those of Árvai (1998) and Világi and Vincze (1995) the interest 
rate transmission has improved since the mid 1990s due to the improvement of 
macroeconomic and financial environment. Our results are in line with those of Crespo-
Cuaresma et al. (2004), despite the different estimation method used and the different time-
span of the data, who find complete pass-through for the short-term corporate loan rate 
and incomplete pass-through for the household deposit rates in Hungary. 
We would like to highlight that our paper focuses on the first stage in the transmission 
mechanism hence, no direct conclusions can be drawn about the strength of the interest 
rate channel. The functioning of the channel is considerably influenced by the interest rate 
sensitivity of consumption and investment expenditures, and by the importance of banking 
instruments in the balance sheets of economic agents. These two factors depend mainly on 
the structure and magnitude of households’ and companies’ net wealth and the significance 
of non-banking financial intermediation. In the case of Hungary, we have to mention an 
important additional factor, namely the access to foreign exchange loans that can substitute 
loans denominated in the national currency.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss several theories that 
provide explanations for the sluggish and incomplete adjustment of bank rates and provide 
an overview of the literature that emphasizes the importance of the structure of the 
financial system. In this section we also highlight the main structural characteristics of the 
Hungarian banking system and compare them to those of the euro countries. In Section 3 
we list several stylized facts that can be established before the econometric analysis. Section 
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4 introduces the linear econometric model and presents the results, and Section 5 covers 
the TAR estimation applied to investigate the potential non-linearities in the adjustment 
process. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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 2 Determinants of interest rate pass-through 
Imperfections of the pass-through raise two different, although not independent questions. 
The first refers to the degree of pass-through, namely the extent at which changes in the 
MMR are passed through to banking rates in the long run. The second aspect is the speed 
of the pass-through, namely how long the adjustment takes. Below we review the 
determinants of the interest rate transmission, with primary focus on the characteristics of 
the financial system, and we touch upon theories of bank rate stickiness. 
2. 1 Role of the financial system  
The varying strength and speed of monetary interest rate transmission can be strongly 
connected with differences in the structural properties of financial systems1, with special 
regard to disintermediation, intensity of competition in the banking sector, capitalization 
and liquidity position of banks, and monetary policy and interest rate volatility. 
Disintermediation 
The degree of disintermediation and the role of non-bank financing have an impact on the 
elasticity of both loan demand and deposit supply with respect to the money market rate. 
On the asset side, loan demand is expected to react more intensely to interest rate changes 
in an economy with developed capital and money markets, as companies may substitute 
bank loans with other forms of financing. Similarly, households’ access to alternative 
investment opportunities of deposits affects the market rate elasticity of deposit supply, 
and consequently the degree of pressure on bank deposit rates.  
Competition among banks 
Intensity of competition among banks also influences the interest rate elasticity of loan 
demand and deposit supply. A low degree of competition, both among banks and with 
non-bank financial markets, implies a higher spread and has an influence on banks’ pricing 
behavior. However, this effect might differ depending on the direction of change in the 
MMR. On the asset side, with limited competition interest rates on loans might react more 
intensely to increases and more sluggishly to decreases of the money market rate, and the 
opposite holds for the liability side, namely for deposits.  
Empirical research on the relationship between competition and pass-through provides 
ambiguous results. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1995) find that differences in market 
concentration among countries do not explain the differences in pass-through significantly. 
In contrast, Mojon (2000) concludes that sharper competition among banks contributes to 
faster and more symmetric adjustment of bank rates. 
Capitalization and l quidity position of banks i
                                                
Well-capitalized and liquid banks are less forced to adjust to changes in monetary policy 
and have the possibility of swallowing the shocks, at least temporarily. For example, a 
 
1 See Cottareli and Kourelis (1994), Ehrmann et. al. (2001), and Mojon (2000). 
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better liquidity position and capitalization provide a better opportunity for banks to 
smooth their interest rates. 
Monetary policy and interest rate volatility  
Changing interest rates on bank instruments incur adjustment costs to banks. Due to these 
so-called menu costs, the adjustment of bank rates depends on banks’ assessment of 
whether a change in the policy rate is temporary or permanent. If a change is considered to 
be temporary, and to be (partially or fully) reversed soon, a bank might decide to smooth 
interest rates. Hence, the pricing behavior of commercial banks is influenced by their 
perception of the nature of changes in interest rates. Accordingly, higher volatility in 
interest rates is likely to lessen the degree/speed of adjustment, as each shift in the market 
rate is probably regarded as temporary. Mojon (2000) as well as Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1995) find evidence in their multiple country empirical study for interest rate volatility 
influencing the pass-through. 
2. 2 Theories of bank rate stickiness 
Theories concerning the pricing behavior of banks constitute a special sub-area of the 
theories of pricing.2 Explanations about price and wage stickiness are also applicable for 
bank rates.  
According to the classical theory, with perfect competition and complete information the 
price is equal to the marginal cost and the derivative of price with respect to the marginal 
cost is equal to one. If the assumptions of perfect competition and complete information 
do not hold, then this derivative declines below one. This idea can be applied to bank rates. 
For instance, the more the market structure moves away from perfect competition towards 
monopolistic competition, the more loan rates exceed the marginal cost of funds. Some 
theories, which explain why bank rates do not move one for one with the market rates are 
based on, for example, ideas of adverse selection, switching cost, consumer irrationality and 
risk sharing. Lowe and Rohling (1992) present an excellent summary of these theories.  
One should note that under certain circumstances and assumptions the bank rates might 
even overreact or forego changes in the policy rate. According to one argument, bank rates 
can change prior to changes in marginal funding. Banks may, for instance, anticipate a rise 
in funding costs and increase loan rates in advance. This argument has higher relevance if 
banks finance longer-term loans with shorter-term deposits, which is usually the case. 
According to our other argument, changes in bank rates can exceed changes in the 
marginal cost of fund. If the required yield of a loan responds one for one with the 
marginal cost of fund, leaving the profit rate unaffected, then the loan rate should also 
change by the same magnitude in a risk-free world. If we assume that borrowers can 
default, the loan rate should cover not only the cost of fund, but also the expected loss 
caused by non-payers. The higher the loan rates, the more the expected loss caused by the 
                                                 
2 There are two different approaches to model pricing: (1) when price changes are time-dependent and (2) 
when decisions on price changes depend on state-variables (state-dependent pricing). Since the cost of fund, 
i.e. the alternative cost, influences pricing decisions mainly at a credit institution, modeling the loan rates as a 
state-dependent variable seems more plausible. 
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group of non-payers. Consequently, loan rates should increase more than the cost of fund 
to cover extra loss.3  
2. 3 Implications of the theories for Hungary  
We begin our empirical analysis by reviewing the Hungarian financial system from the 
point of view of the interest rate pass-through. It is especially important to study the 
structural factors influencing the interest rate pass-through, because most of these factors 
are such institutional characteristics, which can only change gradually (see, for example, 
Mojon; 2001). Because these slowly-changing, country-specific factors will not disappear by 
the time Hungary introduces the euro, the Hungarian pass-through may converge slowly to 
the EMU country pass-through. Even in the EMU the pass-through is found to differ 
substantially across countries (see, for example, Mojon; 2001). Some of the above-
discussed factors support the hypothesis of fast interest rate pass-through in the Hungarian 
financial system, while some factors imply a slow and gradual pass-through. Below we 
evaluate the effect of these factors and make inferences on the pass-through in the future 
based on the expected changes in these structural characteristics. 
Disintermediation 
As pointed out earlier, the phenomenon of disintermediation affects both the asset and the 
liability sides of banks. Below, we discuss both effects.  
In order to evaluate households’ access to alternative investment opportunities, that is 
the interest rate sensitivity of the deposits, one should take a look at the financial 
portfolio of households. In 2002 bank deposits accounted for about 31% of 
households’ total financial assets.  
Table 1 shows that this indicator has similar values in other European countries. 
                                                 
3 Expressing this in a simple formula: requiredl rENr +=−⋅+ 1)1()1(  , where is the loan rate, is 
the expected ratio of non-performing loans. 
lr EN
1
1
1 >−=∂
∂
ENr
r
required
l  , so the loan rate should increase 
more than the required yield does. Thus, if we take into account that the ratio of non-performing loans is not 
constant but is increasing in the loan rate, then the derivative should be even higher.  
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 Table 1 
Households’ bank deposits relative to their total financial assets, 2002 
Country %
Austria 52.1
Belgium 26.1
Finland 32.5
France 28.3
Germany 33.3
Netherlands 19.7
Norway 32.4
Portugal 44.1
Spain 36.5
Sweden 13.6
Hungary 31
Sources: Eurostat and MNB 
Moreover, the share of bank deposits in the total financial assets had declined in the 
previous years: in the last 5 years the share of bank deposits fell by about 10 percentage 
points, while the share of many profitable non-bank investments grew. This reallocation 
was not in favor of direct investments on the capital market, but mostly in favor of life 
insurance related investments, which were subsidized by tax deduction opportunities. This 
shows that investment opportunities other than bank deposits are not only available for 
households, but that households did substitute part of their deposits by alternative 
investments.  
From the asset-side point of view, the consequences of the strength of competition 
between banks and non-bank financial institutions are ambiguous. Capital markets play a 
marginal role in corporate financing. In Hungary, the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP is less than 30% of the EMU country average. However, the financial systems of 
these countries are also dominated by banks. In Hungary, the corporate bond market is 
especially underdeveloped and we do not expect substantial progress in the near future. In 
addition, financial intermediation is continuously deepening.  
On the other hand, about 30% of the loans to this sector come from abroad; mostly from 
banks, and 56% of all loans to the household and corporate sector from domestic and 
foreign banks are denominated in foreign currency (see Table 2). Consequently, 
corporations, especially large corporations, can relatively easily substitute their domestic 
bank loans with foreign currency denominated loans, of which the interest rate is not 
affected by domestic monetary policy.  
To sum up, while the dominance of bank financing indicates a high interest rate elasticity 
of the corporate loan demand, the availability of foreign currency loans might have 
opposite effect. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of corporate and household loans and deposits by currency 
denomination (2003) 
 Non-financial corporations Households 
 Loans Deposits Loans Deposits 
Domestic banks, 
HUF  
44 54 97 87 
Domestic Banks, 
foreign currency 
29 12 3 13 
Foreign banks, 
foreign currency  
27 34 - - 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: MNB 
 
                                                
Competition among banks 
Both the Herfindhal index and the market share of the top 5 banks show that in 
international comparison concentration and competition in the Hungarian bank sector are 
of medium level. The value of the Herfindhal index is about 1000 (see Table 3), so the 
market can be viewed as being almost competitive. However, this aggregate indicator hides 
the differences across the sub-markets, namely, between the corporate and household 
business line. The low value of the Herfindhal index (700–800 in previous years) in the 
corporate business line indicates sharp competition and elastic corporate loan and deposit 
rates. At the same time, competition is rather limited in the household sector. The 
Herfindhal index for this sector is much higher, above 2000.4 However, concentration 
indices do not necessarily show the strength of competition, because other factors, such as 
entry rules and regulations, affect the competition as well. (Móré and Nagy; 2003 and 
Mojon; 2000). Várhegyi (2003) argues that taking into account the efficiency and 
profitability of the Hungarian bank sector modifies our view on competition: the relatively 
low efficiency coupled with high profitability indicates weaker competition. Based on the 
difference of the concentration between the household and corporate sector, we expect to 
have more complete and faster, and perhaps more symmetric pass-through in corporate 
rates than in household rates.  
 
4 The largest Hungarian bank (OTP Bank) dominates the household market, and deposits of households are 
also concentrated at this bank.  
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Table 3 
Concentration of the banking sector in the EMU countries (2002) 
 Share of top 5 banks in 
terms of total assets (%) 
Herfindhal index 
Austria 46 548
Belgium 82
Denmark 68
Finland 79 2000 
France 45
Greece 67 1125 
Netherlands 83 1700 
Ireland 46 486
Germany 20 150
Italy 31
Portugal 60 1000 
Spain 53 870
Average in the EMU region 39 640
Hungary 55 950
Sources: MNB (2004), ECB (2002) 
Capitalization and l quidity position of banks i
The Hungarian banking sector has structural excess liquidity, which is unequally distributed 
among banks. This excess liquidity ensures more freedom to banks in their pricing policy, 
for example a more liquid bank is less forced to adjust its deposit rate quickly and perfectly 
to the increased market rate. Obviously, competition for deposits influences this pricing 
decision as well. 
Excess liquidity has been declining in recent years, which is advantageous for the planned 
shift from passive-side regulation to active-side regulation. The anticipated further 
shrinking of liquidity and the shift to active-side regulation will presumably improve the 
efficiency of the pass-through. 
Monetary policy and interest rate volatility 
The market rate in Hungary as well as the central bank base rate changed by relatively large 
steps in the recent years. This fact motivates the banks to adjust their rates more quickly 
than in other countries enjoying a more stable financial environment. Due to menu costs 
and banks’ intention to smooth interest rates for their customers, higher changes in the 
market rates enforce faster reaction compared to smaller ones (25–50 basis points), which 
are more absorbable by the interest rate margin. On the other hand, the variability in the 
sign of the changes in the market rate counts against a fast interest rate pass-through, since 
it is rational for banks to disregard temporary changes in the market rate in the presence of 
menu costs. 
Hungary’s future entry into EMU causes a downward trend of the domestic interest rate 
because of the interest rate convergence. This trend is not very stable, since the exact time 
of the entry is uncertain. Furthermore, deviations from the trend are possible as is 
exemplified by the rate hikes at the end of 2003. The expected downward trend could 
result in upward rigidity of bank rates, but other factors might counterbalance this effect. 
In addition to the characteristics discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, we find it 
important to emphasize some further typical characteristics of the Hungarian banking 
system that probably influence and determine the pass-through.  
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Credit risk 
Adverse selection might be more relevant in the Hungarian banking sector than in 
countries with a more advanced financial system because in Hungary potential borrowers 
usually have rather short credit history or no credit history at all. Credit history can help 
banks to make inferences about the risk of customers, but the not yet very deep financial 
intermediation and the lack of a positive inter-bank credit register system for the household 
sector further limits the available information about credit risk.  
Term structure of loans and deposits 
We study the pass-through by analyzing the interest rate movements of new 
loans/deposits, although from the point of view of the transmission mechanism it is not 
only these loans but the entire set of loans that matters. The speed of interest rate 
transmission is influenced not only by the adjustment of new loan/deposit rates, but also 
by the term structure of existing loans/deposits. The higher the weight of short-term 
instruments and instruments with variable interest rate in the portfolio, the faster the pass-
through is. In comparison to the European average, loans and deposits have shorter 
average terms in Hungary (more than 90% of corporate loans and deposits and household 
deposits have shorter than one year repricing period). This is typical of countries with 
higher inflation and higher interest rate volatility. With the anticipated decline in inflation 
and the strengthening of economic stability, the duration of loans is expected to become 
longer, indicating a possible slowdown in the interest rate pass-through in the future.  
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 3 Stylized facts  
In order to analyze the pass-through with econometric models, we use data at different 
levels of aggregation, i.e. we have panels of interest rates of individual banks from among 
23 banks for the period January 2001–January 2004 and also estimate dynamic models 
based on aggregated interest rate data calculated as a weighted average of individual bank 
rates. Based on these data we can already formulate some stylized facts about the pass-
through. 
3. 1 Aggregated deposit and loan rates 
Monthly data on aggregate time series are available for corporate short-term loans and 
deposits (up to 1 year), household short-term deposits with a fixed maturity up to 1 year 
and consumer credit up to 5 years. Some important stylized facts emerge from the 
developments in average loan and deposit rates. 
1. The spread between loan rates and the MMR (3-month inter-bank rate, the BUBOR) 
and between the inter-bank rate and deposit rates seems to be related to the movements of 
the MMR. Specifically, the spread between loan rates and the MMR is correlated negatively 
(the correlation coefficient is -0.23 for the corporate and -0.61 for the consumer loan rate), 
while the spread between deposit rates and the money market rate is correlated positively 
with the MMR itself (the correlation coefficient is 0.61 for household and 0.41 for 
corporate deposit rates) (see  
Chart 1 and Chart 2). This indicates imperfect pass-through, although it is not entirely clear 
whether this can be ascribed to incomplete or only sluggish adjustment. 
2. The relationship between the MMR and the different spreads seems to differ over the 
various segments of the market. On the liability side, there is a clear difference between the 
household and corporate business lines. The spread of short-term household deposit rates 
is characterized by higher volatility and stronger association with the MMR than that of 
corporate deposit rates, suggesting that household deposit rates adjust less or at a lower 
speed to changes in the MMR. Household deposit rates are on average lower than 
corporate deposit rates. This is due to the more intense competition in the market of 
corporate funds and to the price insensitive deposit supply of households. However, in 
some periods of significant falls in the MMR, for example in February 2002 and January–
February of 2003, corporate deposit rates temporarily fell below household deposit rates, 
due to the sluggish adjustment of the latter. This leads to the conclusion that commercial 
banks smooth the reactions of deposit rates to the fluctuations of the MMR to a higher 
extent with respect to non-corporate customers. 
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 Chart 1 
Spread between short-term corporate loan rates and the 3-month BUBOR 
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Chart 2 
Spread between deposit rates and the 3-month BUBOR 
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On the other hand, the spread between household deposit rates and the MMR appears to 
be more volatile than the spread between corporate loan rates and the MMR. 
Consequently, the margin between corporate loan rates and household deposit rates, i.e. 
the spread between the revenue from the most important asset and the cost of the most 
important liability, also shows a positive and strong correlation (0.68) with the MMR (see 
Chart 4). This might indicate that commercial banks’ profit is also positively correlated to the MMR 
changes, that is, a higher MMR implies a higher margin for the banks. For example, in the case of an 
 16
interest rate hike gains arising from the widening household deposit spread exceed losses 
deriving from the narrowing corporate loan spread.  
Chart 3 
Spread between short-term corporate loan rates and the 3-month BUBOR 
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3. It is noticeable that in the second part of 2003 commercial banks reacted to increases in 
the MMR with a lag and, consequently, the spread of the corporate loan rate fell to an 
unusually low level. Banks’ perceptions of the changes in the outlook for central bank rates 
and their effect on expectations might explain this relatively slow adjustment to an increase. 
The downward path of interest rates and the process of convergence to EMU, which 
characterized the previous years, might have resulted in an upward rigidity of interest rates, 
as market participants perceived the rate hikes as transitory. Presumably this phenomenon 
played an important role in the sluggish adjustment to the 300 basis point interest rate hike 
of November 2003. Market information5 also supports the idea that the unusually large 
change in the policy rate was partly regarded as transitory, as it was directly triggered by a 
speculative and significant depreciation of the Forint.  
It is necessary to mention that January 2003 should be regarded as an exemption, due to 
the speculative attack. Incomplete adjustment of deposit and loan rates in that period 
coincided with the central bank’s intention. In January 2003, a speculative attack was 
mounted against the strong edge of the Forint’s band. The MNB purchased a considerable 
amount of euros during the two days of the attack, in order to prevent the market rate 
from appreciating further. The central bank responded to the influx of speculative capital 
by slashing interest rates: during the two days of the speculative attack it lowered the 
interest rate on the two-week deposit facility, its main policy instrument, by 200 basis 
points, to 6.5%. However, effective interest rate cuts by the Bank were much greater than 
that, as quantity restrictions were also imposed on the two-week facility. Thus, excess 
liquidity could only be channelled into O/N deposits that continued to be freely available. 
The widening of the overnight interest rate corridor from ±1% to ±3% also entailed a 
drop in yields on the O/N deposit facility with a temporary 500 basis point decline in 
                                                 
5 For example, Reuters poll. 
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effective yields. However, the additional reduction in interest rates in response to the cut in 
the main policy rate was deliberately a temporary phenomenon. The MNB accomplished a 
substantial reduction in the effective interest rate by using alternative instruments, and not 
by changing the policy rate, in order to communicate the temporary nature of this decline.  
4. We also investigate the developments in interest rates on consumer credit. Consumer 
credit rates – in contrast with short-term corporate loan rates – contain a very high, 15–20 
percentage point spread to the market rates. The interest rate on consumer credit is 
apparently less correlated to the market rate, although a part of consumer credit has longer 
maturity, hence direct comparison with the MMR might be somewhat misleading. 
However, one can assume that the lower the weight of costs of fund relative to other 
factors, such as the risk premium content of the interest rate, the weaker the relationship 
between the commercial bank interest rate and the MMR.  
Chart 4 
Spread between consumer credit rates and the 3-month BUBOR 
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5. Obviously, a lower than MMR interest rate on required reserves imposes a burden on 
banks' earnings. During the observed period the required reserve ratio and the interest rate 
paid on reserves changed toward a gradual elimination of the implicit tax on banks through 
reserve requirements, while possibly having a diminishing effect on spreads. The official 
indicator of this implicit tax shows the minimum spread between deposit and loan rates, 
which led to zero profit after complying with the minimum reserve requirement. The 
approximately 80 basis point decrease in this indicator could have led to a reduction in the 
spreads between loan rates and deposit rates, but only the spread between the corporate 
loan rates and MMR has a downward trend over the period January 2000–November 2003. 
Thus, the decline in the corporate loan spread might be attributed mainly to the negative 
correlation between the corporate loan spread and the MMR and the upward trend of the 
MMR in the sample period. 
Chart 6 
Implicit tax on reserves and the spreads 
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Spread levels in international comparison 
The magnitude of spread between the MMR and corporate loan rates is similar to, or even 
lower than that of other European countries. Based on Mojon (2000), in European 
countries corporate loan rates contain a 2–3 percentage point spread over the MMR. This 
spread was 1.5 percentage points on average in Hungary in the period 2000-2003, having 
decreased from its 1996–1999 peak of around 2 percentage points. This reduction might be 
regarded as somewhat surprising, since the share of riskier loans to SMEs (small and 
medium-sized enterprises) has increased continuously in the past few years, and for these 
loans banks charge higher non-interest costs than for those to SMEs. It is possible that a 
fall in the spreads of individual instruments offsets the effect of changing composition.  
On the liability side, however, spreads are somewhat higher than in the euro area. The 
average corporate deposit rate was 1.8 and the household deposit rate was 2.4 percentage 
points lower than the MMR on average in the period under review. These spreads prove to 
be high in comparison to the 1–2 percentage point spreads in the countries of the euro 
area. 
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 4 Linear econometric modeling 
4. 1 Method of estimation  
Let us consider the simplest Error-Correction Model (ECM) as a starting point to measure 
the connection between the market interest rate and the interest rate on loans or deposits: 
tntnntntnntn riri .11,0, )( εδµγβα +−−−∆+=∆ −− ,     (1) 
where  denotes loan or deposit interest rates of the nth bank at period t, and  is the 
MMR of month t. The main advantage of using the model in this form is that both the 
long-run and the short-run parameters can be obtained directly. In the expression for the 
long-term equilibrium relationship
tni , tr
)( 11, −− −− tnntn ri δµ , nδ  means the long-run 
equilibrium relationship and nµ  refers to the spread between the MMR and bank rates.6 
The speed of adjustment parameter is nγ , which has sensible economic interpretation if it 
is positive. The time required for the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium can be 
expressed, for example, by the duration of 80% adjustment, expressed in months.  
Expanding equation (1) with further short-term dynamics we get: 
  (2) tntnntnn
K
k
L
l
ltktknntn riiri .11,
0 1
ln, )( εδµγξβα +−−−∆+∆+=∆ −−
= =
−−∑ ∑
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using the two-step approach of Engle and Granger 
(1987), i.e. first we estimate the expression for the long-run equilibrium ( i tnntn rδµ +=, ) 
and then we substitute the error correction term into equation (1) or (2).  
We estimate the above discussed equations both on aggregated and bank level data. The 
motivation for estimating the model on aggregated data is threefold. First, the sample 
period is longer; second, for the household instruments we have reliable data only on the 
aggregate level; finally, we exclude some of the banks from the panel analysis due to serious 
data failure or because they had an insignificant market share or focused mainly on non-
market-based loans. Aggregate data comprises information about the interest rates of all 
banks that exist in a certain month. Finally, our panel results utilize data of each bank 
equally (we have unweighted estimates). Aggregate data combines data for each bank at a 
certain time, weighting the observations with the (relative) total assets of each bank. So, for 
the corporate business line we can contrast the results obtained from aggregate and panel 
analysis for robustness checks, while on the household business line we can only rely on 
results from aggregate data.  
                                                 
6 Subtracting  from both sides of the long-run equilibrium expression we get tr tnnttn rri )1(, δµ −−=− . 
Now, it is easy to see that the spread ( i ttn r−, ) is constant in the case of complete pass-through (if 1=nδ ), 
but in the case of incomplete adjustment (that is, if 1<nδ ) the higher the MMR the lower the spread on the 
loan market. In the deposit market the opposite holds. 
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As it is not entirely clear which is the instrument that should be considered as the effective 
MMR, we perform the analyses using different measures (1 and 3-month BUBOR and the 
1, 6, and 12-month treasury bills). The results differ somewhat, but the overall message is 
the same, so we only present the results obtained with the 3-month BUBOR in the article. 
Based on separate Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for each variables, and the panel unit 
root tests of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) we find that all 
time series for corporate and household deposit and loan interest rates follow an I(1) 
process and so do the considered MMRs. Johansen cointegration tests between the 
separate interest rate series and the MMRs indicate one cointegrating vectors at least at the 
10% level. According to the residual-based cointegration test in panel data of Kao (1999) 
we have to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration already at the 1% level for both 
the corporate loan and deposit markets. Weak exogeneity tests support the use of single-
equation ECMs for the aggregate as well as for the panel data. During model selection we 
proceed from the more general model (2), fixing the maximum lags at 3, and through 
excluding the insignificant variables we arrive at the final model. 
In May 2001 the Hungarian monetary regime switched to inflation targeting. In order to 
check whether the introduction of the new regime resulted in significantly different pass-
through we estimated the pass-through on two separate samples of aggregate data and 
compared the results. Whereas in case of the shorter panel data starting in January 2001 no 
reliable estimation is possible for the pre-inflation targeting period, consequently, we 
compare the estimates on the full sample with the estimates on the sub-sample 
characterized by the IT regime. We find no significant difference in the pass-through of the 
two regimes on none of the data sets. Therefore, below we show the estimation results that 
utilize all available data. 
 
Estimation techniques applied for the ECM based on aggregate data 
In the aggregate level analysis, the long-term coefficients are estimated using the ARDL 
approach developed by Pesaran and Shin (1997), while the standard errors are calculated 
using the so-called Bewley’s regression (Bewley; 1979).  
Estimation techniques applied for the panel ECM 
In order to find the proper panel ECM specifications, we test the assumption of equal 
slope and intercept parameters over the cross-sectional units (banks).7 The F-tests suggest 
the use of bank-specific constants (banks work with different interest rate spreads) and 
same slopes for the long-run equilibrium equation, both for corporate loans and for 
deposits. When estimating the second stage, in the case of the short-term dynamics, we can 
accept the null of common slope and common intercept and the estimated common 
constant turned out not to differ significantly from zero.  
In light of the above results, we use three estimation methods.  
                                                 
7 We also estimate the ECM separately for each bank (we do not show these results here). This is important, 
on the one hand, to gain some insight into the adjustment behavior of each bank separately, keeping in mind 
the fact that the estimates – especially the long-run equilibrium parameter – are based on a quite limited 
number of observations. On the other hand, it provides ideas on cross-sectional heterogeneity and on the 
final choice of the panel model. We find high and reasonably fast pass-through among the 25 banks and very 
similar parameters. So, average pass-through parameters can be interpreted properly in models with common 
slope coefficients. 
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1. First, we estimated the long-run equation with fixed effect, and the ECM with a 
common effect model (see as FE-OLS). 
2. Second, we estimated both the long-run equation and the ECM with the same method 
under the fixed effect specification, substituting )( 11, −− −− tnntn ri δµ  into the ECM (see as 
FE-FE). 
3. The second method might be biased due to the lagged dependent variable in the ECM, 
but by increasing the sample in the time dimension the magnitude of bias di minishes. 
Although our panel seems to be sufficiently long to neglect the bias, we also estimated the 
ECM equation with GMM (Generalized Methods of Moments) using the approach of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (we refer to this as FE-GMM). 
4. 2 ECM results  
4. 2. 1 Results from aggregate-level analysis 
We use the same short-term loan and deposit data as the one discussed in Subsection 3.1. 
for the aggregate-level analysis. Aggregate data are available for the period January 1997–
April 2004 except for consumer credit, which has a shorter time-span: data are only 
available from May 2001 to April 2004.8 As Table 4 shows, the results are consistent with 
the conclusions derived from the stylized facts but, in addition to providing general insights 
into the adjustment behavior, now we can measure and interpret long-run and short-run 
adjustment separately. The results suggest a clear difference in the adjustment of corporate 
and household interest rates. Corporate loans and deposits have somewhat higher long-run 
pass-through, but the short-run adjustment parameters differ markedly, implying that the 
mean adjustment lag is significantly lower than in the household segment. The corporate 
loan market is the only market with a long-run pass-through parameter close to unity, that 
is, complete adjustment. In all other markets the long-run parameter is significantly lower 
than one, which suggests incomplete pass-through; although in the case of consumer loans 
the null of complete adjustment cannot be rejected because of the very high standard 
errors probably arising from the very short sample.9 In the corporate loan and deposit 
markets the pass-through is reasonably quick; the greatest part of the adjustment takes 
place within two months. This fast and quite high degree of adjustment is probably due to 
high competition in the corporate segment.  
We would like to point out that the difference between the pass-through of corporate and 
household deposits turns out to be mainly due to the difference in the short-term reactions, 
and not so much due to the difference in the long-run pass-through.  
The incomplete and slow adjustment of consumer credit and the very high spread (around 
20 percentage points) can be explained partly by the low interest rate elasticity of demand. 
                                                 
8 For January and February 2003 we introduce two time dummies, because in the period January 17–February 
25 the interest rate corridor was kept wider. However, these dummies turn out not to be significant, so we 
exclude them from the final model. 
9 The fact that the point estimate of δ  is lower for consumer credit than for any other instruments, but due 
to the fact that its 95% confidence interval is about eight times wider than that of corporate or household 
deposits, for which we reject the null, we accept that it clearly illustrates this. 
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These results are in line with those of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004), despite the different 
estimation method used and the different time-span of the data, who find complete pass-
through for the short-term corporate loan rate and incomplete pass-through for the 
household deposit rates in Hungary.  
Table 4 
Results for the ECM estimated on aggregated data (January 1997–April 2004) 
 Corporate loans Corporate deposits Consumer loansa Household deposits 
Long term equation 
Constant (µ) 1.26***  -0.56* 20.03*** -0.76*** 
δ  0.98*** b 
(0.03) 
0.87*** 
(0.02) 
0.81*** 
(0.17) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
Complete pass-
through? (δ =1?) 
Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted  R2 0.95 0.95 0.1 0.96 
Short term dynamics (ECM) 
Contemporaneous 
adjustment 0β  
0.67*** 0.64*** 0.05 0.41*** 
γ  0.56*** 0.32*** 0.54*** 0.34*** 
80% adjustment 
(months) 
2 2 4 3 
Adjusted  R2 0.88 0.72 0.44 0.64 
Number of 
observations 
88 88 36 88 
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
a For consumer loan interest rates, data are available from May 2001 
b The long-term coefficients are estimated using the ARDL approach developed by Pesaran and Shin (1997), while the standard 
errors are calculated using the so-called Bewley’s regression (Bewley; 1979). 
4. 2. 2 Results of the panel data analysis 
Panel data include short-term corporate deposit rates and short-term corporate loan rates 
for the sample period, January 2001–January 2004. The panel results are similar to those on 
aggregate data and the results are alike in the case of all the three estimation techniques. 
Table 5 clearly shows that short-term corporate loan rates appear to fully and quickly adjust 
to the MMR. Most of the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium (80 per cent) takes place 
within two months. The long-run adjustment parameter is close to one and we cannot 
reject the null-hypothesis of complete long-run adjustment at the 5% level. According to 
the panel results, the point estimate of the long-run pass-through of MMR changes to 
corporate deposit rates is very similar to that obtained from the aggregate analysis, however 
in this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete pass-through. The immediate 
adjustment parameter is similar to that of corporate loan rates, and the speed of adjustment 
parameter is somewhat lower.  
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Table 5 
Results for the panel regression for corporate loans and corporate deposits 
 Corporate loans Corporate deposits 
 FE-OLS FE-FE FE-GMM FE-OLS FE-FE FE-GMM 
Long-run equation 
δ  0.95 
 
0.95 
 
0.95 
 
0.87 
 
0.87 
 
0.87 
 
Complete pass-through? 
(δ =1?) 
Yes***a Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
2R  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.71 0.71 0.71 
ECM 
0β  0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.03) 
0.54*** 
(0.03) 
0.70*** 
(0.04) 
1β  0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.04) 
- 0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.03)) 
- 
γ  0.61*** 
(0.03) 
0.61*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.08) 
0.29*** 
(0.03) 
0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.30*** 
(0.12) 
80% adjustment 
(months)) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
N 748 748 748 820 820 820 
2R  0.47 0.45 0.41 0.53 0.52 0.48 
* significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%. 
Monthly data, January  2001-January  2004. 
a To investigate the whether there is complete pass-through on a market we apply the following procedure. We estimate the long-
run relationship assuming complete pass-though and test the stationarity of the residuals using panel unit root tests. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis of unit root implies complete pass-through.  
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 5 Analysis of non-linear adjustment  
There are a number of theoretical reasons for the non-linear adjustment of bank rates. If 
conditions of perfect competition are violated, the pricing behavior of banks might depend 
on properties such as the size and/or the direction of interest rate shocks, and their effects 
on expectations. Below, we examine three cases which might result in non-linear pass-
through. 
1. First, we investigate adjustment of bank rates differ depending on the size of MMR 
change and/or deviation from the long-term equilibrium. Due to presence of menu costs 
and the intention of banks to smooth interest rates for their customers, banks may react 
more intensely to wider changes in the money market rate. In this case the adjustment 
might be significantly faster above a certain threshold. This effect was investigated, for 
example, by Sander and Kleimeier (2003).  
We also investigate whether the adjustment process depends on the sign of the MMR 
change and/or the sign of the deviation from the long-term equilibrium. Asymmetric 
adjustment might be entailed by the low interest rate elasticity of loan demand and deposit 
supply, due to the profit maximizing behavior of banks under market imperfections and 
adjustment costs (see Section 2). A usual finding in the literature (e.g. Hannan and Berger; 
1991, Sander and Kleimeier; 2002) is that loan rates are more rigid downward, while 
deposit rates tend to be sticky upward.   
2. Adjustment of bank rates might also differ depending on the size of MMR change 
and/or deviation from the long-term equilibrium. Due to presence of menu costs and the 
intention of banks to smooth interest rates for their customers, banks may react more 
intensely to wider changes in the money market rate. In this case the adjustment might be 
significantly faster above a certain threshold. This effect was investigated, for example, by 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003). 
3. Third, we analyze the effect of yield volatility on the pass-through. Higher volatility, and 
hence higher interest rate uncertainty, might attenuate the adjustment, as banks judge the 
changes in the money market rate as transitory. This effect was demonstrated by Mojon 
(2000) in an analysis of European countries. However, in our view, higher volatility is often 
accompanied by larger changes in yields, which hastens the adjustment process. The final 
outcome, emerging from these two opposite effects, is highly uncertain.  
5. 1 Method 
We apply TAR models (we also estimated STAR (Smooth Transition AutoRegressive) 
models, which provided us with rather odd results, so we choose to present here those 
obtained from TAR models), in which the adjustment parameters differ depending on the 
position of the so-called indicator variable. Non-linearities enter only in the ECM equation, 
where it is assumed that non-linearities influence only the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium. These threshold effects were investigated, for example, by Sander 
and Kleimerier (2003), where the authors constructed two regimes with different gamma 
parameters. We introduce two regimes not only for the speed of adjustment, but also for 
 25
the contemporaneous adjustment parameters. The general form of our model is the 
following:  
tntttnttnttttn GririIrri .11,11,00, )()( εµδγµδγββα +−−−−−−∆+∆+=∆ −−∗−−∗ ,   (3) 
where  
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The indicator variables (x, y) in the different specifications:   
1. Size asymmetry: tt ry ∆=  and µδ −−= −− 11, ttnt rix      (6) 
2. Sign asymmetry:  and tt ry ∆= )( , µδ −−−= −− 11 ttnt rix  and c1=c2=0.   (7) 
3. Volatility asymmetry: , and c)(rstdevyx tt == 1=c2=c    (8) 
Volatility is measured by the 2-month standard deviation of the 3-month benchmark yield. 
 In the case of the sign asymmetry, the thresholds are set to zero, ( 021 == cc ), that is the 
estimation is reduced to a simple OLS with dummy variables. When analyzing size and 
volatility asymmetry, the threshold values are also estimated by the so-called sequential 
conditional least squares. This means that we estimate a simple OLS under different 
thresholds, and then the model with the smallest standard error is chosen (see Franses and 
van Dijk (2000) p. 84, for further details). The set of possible threshold values were 
established in such a way that each regime contains at least 15 per cent of the total 
observations. We estimate the model on both aggregated and panel data and use the FE-
OLS specification for panel data analysis.  
In our specification in the immediate adjustment and the adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium in one regime (where  or G  is zero) is characterized by  and tI t 0β γ , 
respectively. However, in the other regime (where the indicator functions become one) the 
corresponding parameters are  and  (and not  and  like, for example in 
the case of Sander and Kleimerier; 2003).  We opted for this specification because the 
possible difference between the different regimes can be simply captured and tested by the 
size, sign, and significance of the star parameters.  
*
00 ββ + *γγ + *0β *γ
We do not present the results for the consumer loans due to the very limited number of 
available observations. 
5. 2 Results of TAR estimations 
5. 2. 1 Size asymmetry 
Both aggregated and panel data estimations confirm that the pricing of corporate loan and 
deposit rates is non-linear, but depends on the size of MMR change and the size of 
deviation from the long term equilibrium (see Table 6). In the case of corporate loan rates, 
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both the speed of adjustment and the contemporaneous adjustment parameters are 
significantly higher above a certain threshold, according to both the aggregate data and the 
panel data. According to the panel results, a change in the MMR which is higher than 60 
basis points entails three times larger contemporaneous adjustment than in the case of 
lower MMR changes. Moreover, the speed of adjustment parameter is significant only 
when the error correction term exceeds 30 basis points. In the case of corporate deposit 
rates, the panel results suggest non-linearity only for the contemporaneous adjustment 
parameter, while aggregated results show asymmetry for both relationships. Aggregate data 
show non-linearity in the contemporaneous parameter for household deposit rates, but no 
non-linearity for the speed of adjustment towards the long-term equilibrium. 
 We note here that for the contemporaneous adjustment parameters, the thresholds for 
which standard error of regression is minimized turn out to be rather high values, around 
60-80 basis points.  
Table 6 
Size asymmetry - TAR results 
 Panel data 
(Jan. 2001–Jan. 2004) 
Aggregate data 
(Jan. 1997–Apr. 2004) 
 Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Household 
deposits 
0β  0.28** 0.20** 0.56*** 0.22** 0.14** 
∗
0β  0.46*** 0.56*** 0.14** 0.46*** 0.35*** 
1c (%point) 0.59 0.67 0.82 0.70 0.82 γ  0.16 0.30*** 0.46** 0.25*** 0.45*** 
∗γ  0.80*** - 0.25** 0.30*** - 
2c (%point) 0.28 - 0.52 0.24 - 
N 748 820 89 89 89 
*** Significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
5. 2. 2 Sign asymmetry 
Our results on asymmetric sign responses (presented in Table 7) are partly in line with 
other empirical studies which report downward stickiness in the loan market (see, for 
example, Mojon; 2000 and Sander and Kleimeier; 2002). Panel and aggregate results turn 
out to be similar for corporate deposits rates (both fail to detect evidence of sign 
asymmetry. Corporate loan rates prove to be sticky downwards, i.e. the immediate 
adjustment is significantly higher (at 5%) when the MMR increases than when it decreases. 
Panel results suggest slower adjustment to underpricing than to overpricing (hence, 
downwards stickiness), while the opposite is found in the aggregate analysis. However, 
these asymmetries are not significant at the 5% significance level, only at 10%.  
One might expect downward stickiness in loan rates and upward rigidity in deposits rates 
due to the profit maximizing behavior of banks in case of weak competition, if loan 
demand and deposit supply are inelastic with respect to possible smoothing of changes in 
MMR (for example, if an increase in MMR does not or only partially passes through to 
bank deposit rates does not lead to substantial decrease in deposit supply). However, taking 
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into account the strong competition in the corporate segment and the fact that our linear 
model shows quick and complete pass-through for the corporate loan rates, our results 
might be regarded as somewhat surprising. In addition, the expected downward trend of 
domestic interest rates due to Hungary’s future entry into the EMU (discussed in Section 
1.3) possibly refers to upward rigidity. Another remarkable result is that household deposit 
rates react more intensely to MMR increases than to decreases. These unpredicted results 
might be partly attributed to the fact that the average size of MMR rate increases is higher 
than that of MMR falls and size effect may dominate sign effect in our analysis. 
Table 7 
Sign asymmetry – TAR results 
 Panel data 
(Jan. 2001–Jan. 2004) 
Aggregated data 
(Jan. 1997–Apr.  2004) 
 Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Household 
deposits 
0β  0.59*** 0.62*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.26*** 
∗
0β  0.19** 0.16 0.24*** 0.04 0.28*** 
γ  0.54*** 0.44*** 0.71*** 0.27* 0.38*** 
∗γ  0.16* -0.12 -0.34* 0.09 -0.09 
N 748 820 89 89 89 
*** Significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
5. 2. 3 Volatility asymmetry 
Although our results vary somewhat over the different types of instrument, at least one of 
the adjustment parameters turns out to be significantly higher above a certain level of yield 
volatility for all types of bank rates (see Table 8). This indicates that the effect of higher 
interest rate changes on the pass-through exceeded the adverse effect of higher interest rate 
uncertainty. It is important to emphasize that we cannot distinguish between the effect of 
higher uncertainty on expectations and the effect of larger changes in yields, which is a 
consequence of higher interest rate volatility. This makes the interpretation of our results 
difficult. The year 2003 serves as a good illustration. In this period, money markets could 
be characterized by high uncertainty about the convergence process, which was reflected in 
the increased risk premiums and volatility of yields. Higher volatility was accompanied by 
wider movements in yields. Monetary policy reacted by unusually large policy rate changes 
to the risk premium shocks.  
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Table 8 
Volatility asymmetry –TAR results 
 Panel data 
(Jan. 2001–Jan. 2004) 
Aggregated data 
(Jan. 1997–Apr.  2004) 
 Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Corporate 
loans 
Corporate 
deposits 
Household 
deposits 
0β  0.43*** 0.22** 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.15* 
∗
0β  0.34*** 0.52*** 0.23*** 0.37*** 0.32*** 
γ  0.54*** 0.37*** 0.55*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
∗γ  0.21*** -0.01 0.14 0.41** 0.24*** 
c (%point) 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.12 
N 748 820 86 86 86 
*** Significant at  1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
5. 2. 4 Controlling for different asymmetric effects  
Despite the above mentioned difficulties in distinguishing the different sources of 
asymmetric effects, we make an attempt to separate the different asymmetric effects from 
each other (i.e., to control for one effect when investigating the other). We estimate TAR 
models that include two types of asymmetries. As we suspect among the three interrelated 
effects that it is the size effect that dominates the others we run regressions where we 
always controlled for the size effect. Due to the highly increased number of regimes, we 
only focus on the panel data for this exercise. Because raises in the MMR were in general 
higher than the decreases, we now let the threshold values differ when distinguishing big 
and small increases and decreases in the 3-month BUBOR (e.g., in equation 6  is allowed 
to be different for increases  and for decreases ). This means, for example, that 
when investigating sign and size asymmetries in one model, in the case of the immediate 
pass-through we construct two indicator functions:  
and , where subscripts M and S refer to magnitude and sign, 
respectively.  
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Size and sign asymmetry  
According to the results in Table 9, for the corporate loan market, immediate adjustment to 
small negative changes in the MMR is slow ( 0β =0.14) and insignificant in the case of small 
negative changes in the MMR. Increases induce faster immediate adjustment (the 
parameter belonging to the cross product with  is 0.17 but is only significant at the 10% 
level) while we again find evidence for a strong size effect (the parameter expressing the 
size effects is 0.48 and is significant at the 1% level). In the case of speed of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium, we only find evidence of the size effect. Results for the corporate 
deposit market are very much in line with what we found when analyzing the sign and size 
asymmetries separately: we do not find any significant asymmetric effect for the speed of 
adjustment to the equilibrium, while the immediate adjustment turns out to be significantly 
StI
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and considerably higher for big changes in the MMR than to small ones (the parameter 
belonging to the cross product with  is 0.83 and significant even at the 1% level). These 
results support the idea that size effects dominate sign effects. 
MtI
Table 9 
Sign and size asymmetry, volatility and size asymmetry  
 Sign and size asymmetry Volatility and size asymmetry 
 Corporate loans Corporate deposits Corporate loans Corporate deposits 
0β  0.14 0.05 0.33*** 0.18** 
∗
S0β  0.17* -0.07 - - 
∗
M0β  0.48*** 0.83*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 
∗
V0β  - - -0.15** 0.18** 
+
Mc1 (%point) 1 1 0.70 0.78 
−
Mc1 (%point) -0.23 -0.24 -0.59 -0.60 
Vc1     0.19 
γ  -0.07 0.58*** -0.20 0.32*** 
∗
Sγ  -0.16* 0.11 - - 
∗
Mγ  0.79*** -0.19 0.77*** -0.09 
∗
Vγ  - - 0.25** -0.10* 
Mc1 (%point) 0.28 0.49 0.19 0.82 
Vc1  - - 0.28 0.19 
 748 820 748 820 
Subscripts S, M, and V refer to magnitude (size), size, and volatility, respectively. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Size and volatility asymmetry 
Results of a regression that includes factors for size and volatility asymmetry at the same 
time differ from those obtained from separate regressions with respect to the volatility 
asymmetry while the finding that bigger changes in the MMR induce faster adjustment 
appears to be robust (see Table 9). On the corporate loan market the parameters belonging 
to the size dummies are considerably higher than those of the volatility dummies, and are 
positive and significant even at the 1% level. The parameter that captures the difference of 
immediate adjustment between the more and less volatile periods is negative (-0.15) and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that when there is more uncertainty around the 
future evolvement of the MMR, banks are more reluctant to modify their interest rates. On 
the corporate deposit market we find significant and about 3.7 times faster immediate 
reaction of the interest rates for bigger changes in the MMR than for smaller ones while we 
could not find significant size asymmetry in the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. At 
the same time, this adjustment appears to be significantly slower (only at the 10% level) in 
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more volatile periods, but immediate adjustment turn out to be faster when the MMR is 
more volatile.  
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the interest rate pass-through in Hungary. First, we highlighted 
stylized facts of the markets for various loans and deposits. Second, we analyzed the 
adjustment of bank rates with econometric models. These models can capture important 
aspects of the adjustment, such as adjustment in the long-run, the speed of adjustment to 
the equilibrium and short-term responses. 
Our results suggest a clear difference in the pricing of household and corporate 
instruments. In the case of corporate deposits and loans, both the degree and the speed of 
adjustment exhibit a stronger transmission than the corresponding household interest rates 
do. Corporate loans and deposits have higher long-term pass-through and faster short-term 
adjustment, which is also reflected in the significantly lower value of mean adjustment lag 
than in the case of the household loan and deposit markets. This result is probably due to 
the fact that in the corporate segment – in contrast with the household sector – 
competition is very intense. On the corporate market we found complete pass-through, 
while in the household segment the estimated long-run parameter turned out to be 
significantly lower than one. However, we were unable to reject the null of complete 
adjustment in case of the household loan rates, because of the very high standard errors 
arising form the short sample period. The adjustment of consumer credit interest rates 
proved to be exceptionally incomplete and slow, probably reflecting the low interest rate 
elasticity of loan demand and the high proportion of risk premium. Comparing our results 
with those of Árvai (1998) and Világi and Vincze (1995) the interest rate transmission has 
improved since the mid 1990s due to the improvement of macroeconomic and financial 
environment. Our results are in line with those of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004), despite 
the different estimation method used and the different time-span of the data, who find 
complete pass-through for the short-term corporate loan rate and incomplete pass-through 
for the household deposit rates in Hungary. 
European empirical studies conclude that short-term corporate loan rates adjust completely 
in the long run, although some studies have the opposite conclusion. Hence, corporate 
loan rates in Hungary behave similarly to other European countries’ loan rates, in terms of 
long term adjustment. Regarding the short-term adjustment of corporate loan rates, we find 
the Hungarian rates to adjust very fast; the recent ECB study (de Bondt, 2002) find the first 
period adjustment to be less than 50% for the EMU countries, whereas we estimated this 
adjustment parameter to be much higher, about 70%.  
In contrast to the corporate loan rates, much less empirical studies analyze the adjustment 
of deposit rates and household loan rates. These few studies find that even the long term 
adjustment of these rates is very slow: ranges between 40-70%. Even so, consumer credit 
rates in Hungary are found to be more rigid in international comparison, at least with 
regard to the instant adjustment.  
We analyzed the potential non-linearities of banks’ pricing with threshold ECM models. 
The results suggest that the speed of the pass-through of MMR changes to bank rates 
depends on the size of the changes in the MMR and, in particular for corporate loan rates, 
on the size of the distance of bank rates from their long-term equilibrium. We found the 
adjustment to be significantly faster for changes above a threshold level than for smaller 
ones and this finding appears to be robust to model specification. This phenomenon can 
be explained by the presence of menu costs. The sign of yield shocks also turned out to be 
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influential for the speed of adjustment. In line with international experience, we found that 
corporate loan rates are characterized by downward rigidity, probably due to the profit 
maximizing behavior of banks. Surprisingly, the sharp competition in the corporate loan 
segment could not fully counterbalance this downward rigidity. We also found that 
household deposit rates adjust more rapidly to upward than to downward shifts in the 
MMR. This seemingly counterintuitive finding can be explained by the fact that the average 
size of positive shocks exceeded the average size of negative ones in the sample period. We 
also analyzed how the volatility of money market rate affects the pass-through. At least one 
of the parameters determining the speed of pass-through changed towards faster 
adjustment when the volatility of the market rate exceeded a certain level. Intuitively, 
higher volatility should be accompanied by higher uncertainty and hence more sluggish 
adjustment. However, high volatility can be accompanied by larger changes, for which we 
found faster adjustment, as mentioned above. The size effect and the effect of uncertainty 
are hardly separable. We think that in the volatile periods, especially in 2003, the effect of 
uncertainty was dominated by the size effect. However, faster pass-through could not 
completely offset the effect of higher money market rate shocks, which resulted in higher 
volatility of the spread between bank rates and the money market rate. In other words, 
higher shocks resulted in larger deviations from long term equilibrium and hence higher 
movements in the spread between bank rates and the money market rate, despite the 
quicker pass-through. The counterintuitive findings with respect to volatility asymmetry are 
mitigated as soon as we make an attempt to control for the size effect. 
Our results reflect the adjustment of bank loan and deposit rates in the investigated sample 
period. However, we believe that some tendencies could change the pass-through in the 
future. The relatively weak competition in the household sector is expected to improve, 
likely resulting in a faster and more complete pass-through. Some of the banks, for 
example, started to fight for household deposits, considered as advantageous core funding, 
of which about 40% is still owned by one bank. Deficiencies in the deposit rate adjustment 
might be improved by the anticipated further shrinking of excess liquidity in the financial 
system coupled with the shift to active-side regulation from the present passive-side 
regulation. As excess liquidity disappears, competition for deposits is expected to sharpen. 
Progress with the adjustment of household loan rates depends mainly on the future trends 
in the markets of consumption loans and housing mortgages. The extraordinary high 
spreads of consumer credit rates might motivate banks to enter this segment and step up 
competition, leading to lower spreads and improved pass-through. Up to recent times, 
most of the mortgage loans were government-aided with fixed rates, so policy rate changes 
could and can hardly have any effect on these rates. The regulation of government-
subsidized loans changed in December 2003. Since then, the maximum rate of newly 
granted subsidized loans has depended on the market rate with same maturity. Obviously, 
this change in the regulation improves the pass-through. And a final hypothesis is that as 
the average maturity of loans extends in accordance with declining inflation and interest 
rate uncertainty, the average loan rate is expected to become less dependent on the policy 
rate.   
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